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that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of the expert’s reliability: he considers 
the expert’s true forecasts as the outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. 
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Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common per-
period payoﬀ at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability
that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage.
Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action
at every period according to his posterior beliefs. At the end of each round
of play, the true current state is veriﬁable. The distinctive assumption
of the paper is that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of
the expert’s reliability: he considers the expert’s true forecasts as the
outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. The paper shows
that the expert will have instrumental reputational concerns, related to
the future estimate of the systematic error associated to his predictions. In
contrast with previous work, reputational concerns are shown to enhance
the credibility of the initial messages, and to increase both the agents’
expected payoﬀ at the ﬁrst round of play in equilibrium. The equilibrium
messages will be noisy, but noisiness will be less costly than it would be
in single-stage games.
Key words: opinion, expert, strategic communication
JEL codes: D81, D84
1 Introduction
Many decisions depend on trusting someone. Trust matters especially when a
decision-maker is uncertain about some event of interest and asks for advice to
someone else called expert. In order to put the advice to use, the very ﬁrst
choice of the decision-maker will concern his subjective assessment of the relia-
bility that he judges to be typical of the honest opinions of the expert. Indeed,
∗Address: Department of Statistics, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, via Bicocca
degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy, email: irene.valsecchi@unimib.it
1a decision-maker could not even approach the problem of strategic communica-
tion on the expert’s side if he did not know how to deal with straight messages.
The reliability of an honest advice may not be obvious when the expert makes
predictions and the decision-maker has little substantive knowledge of the fac-
tors aﬀecting the uncertain event of interest. For instance, the decision-maker
may not be aware of the speciﬁc process of information extraction connecting
signals and beliefs according to the expert. In that case honest forecasts are not
reliable per se. The decision-maker may take messages as being truthful and
biased at the same time: they can report the opinion of the expert faithfully,
and still be subject to some systematic error. The repeated interaction between
a decision-maker and an expert of uncertain reliability is the concern of the
present paper.
In particular, I consider a simple model of strategic communication between
two agents, who play a two-stage cheap-talk game. The agents have the same
preferences and aim at maximizing the undiscounted sum of the single-period
payoﬀs of their joint activity. At every round of play the decision-maker is
uncertain about the current and binary state of nature, that is identically and
independently distributed across time. The expert is a probability assessor
and is supposed to believe in the validity of his own predictions. At every
stage the expert forms his belief and sends to the decision-maker a message.
Having received the message, the decision-maker updates his probability that the
current state is low. Then, the decision-maker takes an action that determines
the state-contingent single-period payoﬀ, common to both the agents.
Recurring to the statistical literature on the expert problem, the distinctive
assumption of the paper is the following: the decision-maker makes a subjective
assessment of the honest forecasts of the expert. In particular, the decision-
maker takes the expert’s true beliefs as the realizations of an experiment with
an unknown parameter η. That parameter is a measure of the systematic error
in the predictions of the expert. So the expert’s true beliefs are considered
to be the outcomes of a random variable having a probability density function
conditional on the true state and the unknown parameter η. At the initial stage
the decision-maker believes the parameter η to be a drawing from some prior
distribution function of η with support in the closed unit interval of the real
line.
At the end of the ﬁrst stage, both the agents observe the true current state
of nature, and the decision-maker revises his measure of the statistical bias of
the expert. At the second round the same stage game is played again with
new beliefs and a new message, action and state. The paper focuses on perfect
Bayesian equilibria. The equilibrium properties will be valued with respect to
the agents’ expected payoﬀs, not with respect to information transmission, since
reputation in only subjectively assessed by the decision-maker.
The paper shows that the expert will not reveal his beliefs truthfully in
equilibrium at the last round of play. At period 2 the decision-maker’s best
action will be proportional to his posterior probability that the current state
is low. Since the agents share a common single-period payoﬀ, if they hold
a common belief that the current state is low, they will agree to the optimal
2current action. However, when the decision-maker cannot rule out the possibility
of an honest expert being biased, even in the case of genuine reports, the single-
period payoﬀ expected by the agents will be diﬀerent, as well as their best
action. So at each round of play the single-period payoﬀ expected by the expert
will decrease in the distance between his true belief and the decision-maker’s
posterior probability that the current state is low. If the decision-maker expects
honest messages, the expert will have an incentive to send dishonest messages.
Strategic communication will work in the following way: if the expert is more
conﬁdent that a high state occurs, he will announce a probability that the
current state is high greater than his true belief; if the expert is more conﬁdent
that a low state occurs, he will announce a probability that the current state
is low higher than his true belief. In other words, the expert will exaggerate
his reports in order to lead the decision-maker to believe what he believes. The
worse is the reputation of the expert in the decision-maker’s mind, the less
reactive will be the decision-maker to messages. As a result, the distortion in
the announced probability will be stronger, and the loss expected by the expert
will be higher.
At each round the expert will choose a message rule, that is a probability
density function of message mt conditional on his belief pt. The paper shows
that in equilibrium the support of the ﬁnal message rules of the expert will be
a ﬁnite partition of the closed unit interval of the real line. Unlike the usual
outcomes of cheap-talk games, equilibria are proved to exist for every ﬁnite
cardinality of the equilibrium partition at period 2. The reason is that in the
present paper the main problem is the conﬂict of opinions between the agents:
the decision-maker will choose an action that can be higher or lower than the
expert’s unconstrained best action. That "non-monotonic" conﬂict between
the agents is essential in yielding the result of no ﬁnite upper bound to the
equilibrium partitions at the second stage.
In equilibrium the expert’s incentive to misreport will reduce both the agents’
ﬁnal expected payoﬀs. At the ﬁnal stage of play both the agents would be better
oﬀ if the expert could commit to some message rules the support of which were
a ﬁnite partition diﬀerent from the equilibrium one. Moreover, the equilibrium
ﬁnal payoﬀ expected by the expert at the end of period 1 is shown to depend
on the ﬁnal bias expected by the decision-maker. Hence, the message that the
expert chooses to send at period 1 will have both a direct eﬀect on his expected
current payoﬀ, and an indirect eﬀect on his future reputation and his expected
future payoﬀ.
The paper shows that honest initial reports cannot be supported in equilib-
rium for every equilibrium proﬁle at the ﬁnal stage of play. As far as the expert’s
ﬁnal reputation is concerned, the paper shows the following. If the true state at
period 1 is low and the expert has induced the decision-maker to have a lower
probability that the initial state is low, the expert’s reputation at period 2 will
be worse than it would have occurred if he had induced a higher probability.
The opposite will obtain if the true state at period 1 is high. Moreover, if the
expert induces the decision-maker to have a low probability that the initial state
is low, his future reputation will improve with respect to the expected current
3bias only if the true state at period 1 is high.
Instrumental reputational concerns at period 1 are shown to imply a trade-
oﬀ between two conﬂicting purposes: a) the maximization of the initial payoﬀ
expected by the expert, and b) the minimization of the future loss expected by
the expert when his reputation falls. In equilibrium the expert’s reputational
concern at period 1 will partially oﬀset his incentive to misreport at the ﬁrst
round of play. In other words, instrumental reputational concerns will enhance
the credibility that the decision-maker can associate to the ﬁrst-period messages.
Consequently, the equilibrium payoﬀ at period 1 expected by both the agents
will be higher in repeated games than in single-stage games. In equilibrium
all the agents will gain from reputational concerns. That result is in contrast
with recent contributions showing that reputational concerns will impair the
equilibrium welfare properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the
related literature, and, in Section 3, I describe the assumptions and the basic
model. Section 4 is concerned with the equilibria properties at the last stage of
play. Section 5 focuses on the equilibrium reports at the ﬁrst round of play. In
Section 6, I conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
In the economic literature professional advice is often analyzed by way of models
of asymmetric information. At least two agents are interested in the value of
some parameter or state of the world θ. Only one agent, called expert, is going
to observe some new data Y . All the parties agree upon the parameter space,
the space of the realizations of Y and the conditional distribution of Y given
θ for all possible values of θ (Bayarri-DeGroot (1991)). The consensus upon
the distribution of Y conditional on the unknown parameter makes expertise a
special instance of private information to be revealed according to the rules of
strategic communication1.
In particular, the quality of information exchanged in equilibrium2 is a major
concern in cheap-talk games, along the path initiated by Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Ex-ante an agent called sender has observed the value of a random
variable, that can be modelled as the sender’s type. The sender sends a message
to a receiver. The receiver takes an action that determines the welfare of both
the agents, jointly with the sender’s type. The sender is a "partisan" expert
because he is better informed than the decision-maker, and because he has
preferences over actions, typically diﬀerent from the decision-maker. Messages
are not veriﬁable and are "cheap" because their transmission is free of any direct
1A diﬀerent approach to the issue of professional advice is taken by the contributions
concerned with credence goods. In that case, fraud and cheating are the major problems
in the interaction between experts and consumers (for an extensive review, see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006)).
2In principal-agent relationships optimal delegation can be an eﬀective susbtitute to ineﬃ-
cient mechanisms inducing disclosure of private information (for instance, Demski-Sappington
(1987), Li-Suen (2004) and Alonso-Matouschek (2008)).
4cost. Equilibria are shown to involve noisy messages because the expert engages
in strategic information communication. The present paper takes from Crawford
and Sobel the idea of a partisan expert: the expert’s expected payoﬀ will depend
on the action taken by the decision-maker. However, while in Crawford and
Sobel truthful messages will be sent in equilibrium when the interests of the
agents coincide3, in the present paper noisiness will persist under solidarity in
equilibrium.
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a) consider a professional expert concerned
about appearing to be well informed about the current state of the world. Ex-
ante the expert knows his ability, otherwise unobservable. During the game
only the expert observes a private signal generated by a multiplicative linear
experiment. In such experiment the ability of the expert is the measure of the
amount of information that is encoded in the signal. After observing the signal,
the expert is free to publicly report any message. At the end of the period an
evaluator combines the message from the expert with the ex-post realization of
the state to update the belief regarding the ability of the expert. That posterior
belief is the reputation of the expert that determines his ﬁnal payoﬀ. So the
correspondent cheap-talk game is static and the expert is perfectly indiﬀerent to
the current use of his report. The expert’s reputational concern is shown to be
incompatible with truthful messages in equilibrium. In particular, if the prior is
already concentrated on any particular state, the expert will always wish to bias
his report in the same direction. The present paper shares with Ottaviani and
Sorensen the idea that reputational concerns can matter; however, the concern
for reputation will descend endogenously from the expert’s desire to be believed
in his repeated interaction with the decision-maker4.
Credibility in repeated rounds of information transmission is analyzed by
Sobel (1985) for a case in which the receiver must decide whether to trust the
sender, whose motives are uncertain. If the sender is a friend, he will share the
same preferences of the receiver; if he is an enemy, his best action will be the
opposite of the decision-maker’s best action. Sender and receiver interact for
a ﬁnite number of times. At the beginning of every stage, the agents observe
a random variable that measures the importance of that current round. Only
the sender observes the value of a binary random variable, that is indepen-
dently and identically distributed across time. Then the sender sends a message
to the receiver, who takes a decision aﬀecting the welfare of both the agents.
The players maximize the undiscounted sum of their single-period payoﬀs. The
agents’ single-period payoﬀ depends on the distance between action and signal.
The sender’s best action will be the signal if he is a friend, while it will be
the opposite of the signal if he is an enemy. Repeated interaction between the
agents, coupled with veriﬁable information at the end of each period of inter-
action, is shown to make it worthwhile for the receiver to build a reputation
3Crawford and Sobel show that the amount of information revealed in equilibrium will
increase as the preferences of the sender and the receiver become more aligned.
4Contributions concerned with either the relative evaluation of many esperts (Ottaviani-
Sorensen (2006b, 2006c), Scharfstein-Stein (1990)) or multiple signals about the same state
of the world (Li (2007), Prendergast-Stole (1996)) are less closely related to this paper.
5for truthfulness5. In equilibrium the sender typically conveys accurate informa-
tion for the ﬁrst several periods. An enemy will eventually take advantage of
the receiver by misleading him and losing all opportunities for deception in the
future. The present paper shares with Sobel the idea of a repeated interaction
between expert and decision-maker, both interested in the maximization of the
undiscounted sum of the single-period payoﬀs. However, the uncertainty about
the expert’s preferences is replaced by the decision-maker’s uncertainty about
the expert’s ability as a probability assessor. Moreover I will consider two-stage
games only.
In S. Morris (2001) an informed advisor wishes to convey his valuable infor-
mation to an uninformed decision-maker in a two-stage cheap-talk game. The
decision-maker believes that the advisor may have preferences diﬀerent from his
own, biased in favor of particular decisions. At every round, the advisor observes
a noisy signal of the current and binary state of the world, and sends a message
to the decision-maker. Having received the message, the decision-maker takes
an action from a continuum, aﬀecting the welfare of both the agents. At the
end of the period the state is veriﬁed and the decision-maker updates his be-
liefs about the advisor’s preferences, given his message and the true state of the
world at the ﬁrst period. Then the game is played again, with the same advisor
but a new state, signal, message and action. Here the advisor has no intrinsic
reputational concerns as in Ottaviani and Sorensen, but he has instrumental
reputational concerns, that arise exclusively from his desire to have his unbi-
ased advice listened to in the future. Morris shows that the advisor will have a
reputational incentive to lie at the ﬁrst stage, if he does not wish to be mistaken
for a biased expert. So, when reputational concerns are suﬃciently important
relatively to the current decision problem, no information will be conveyed in
equilibrium at the ﬁrst period. The present paper shares with Morris the idea
that an expert cares about his reputation instrumentally. Once again, the as-
sumption of a conﬂict of interest between the agents is replaced by diﬀerent
opinions over the probability that a particular state is realized.
While the economic contributions are mostly concerned with the strategic
reporting of predictions, it is the use of predictions that is paid particular atten-
tion by the statistical literature. French (1986) summarizes the expert problem
in the following way: a decision-maker needs to assess his subjectivity prob-
ability for an event θ of interest; having little substantive knowledge of the
factors aﬀecting θ, the decision-maker asks another person for advice. An ex-
pert is anyone who can give predictions, i.e. anyone who can make probability
statements, called judgments or opinions, concerning the event of interest. The
problem is: how should the decision-maker incorporate the honest opinion of
an expert into his own? P.A. Morris (1974, 1977), Lindley et al. (1979), and
French (1980) suggest a Bayesian modeling approach to the use of experts6.
The decision-maker should look upon the true opinion of the expert as a piece
of data: consulting an expert is like performing an experiment, and just as
5Honesty in informal communication is further analysed by Olszewski (2004).
6Related works are Morris (1983) and Genest-Schervish (1985).
6the results of an experiment are a priori unknown to the experimenter, so the
advice of the expert is uncertain to the decision-maker prior to receiving it. Ac-
cording to P.A. Morris (1974), the model of the expert in the decision-maker’s
mind is a likelihood function l(p(θ) | θ), that represents the probability of the
event that the expert’s prior is p(θ) given θ (not the probability of a probabil-
ity in the classical sense)7. The likelihood function l(p(θ) | θ) summarizes the
decision-maker’s subjective measure of the expert’s reliability8. Consequently, a
distinction is required between the meaning of an honest probability assessment
to the decision maker and the expert himself: the expert looks at his probability
assessment as the reﬂection of his own information, the decision-maker takes the
expert’s true opinion as information itself. The present paper borrows from the
statistical literature the idea that the decision-maker has his own model of the
true opinions of the expert. Further, it makes an attempt to reconcile it with
strategic behavior on the expert’s side, that is typical of the economic literature.
The role of probability assessor played by the expert in the present paper
is quite close to the spirit of Harris and Raviv (1993). They consider a popu-
lation of agents who receive public information but interpret that information
diﬀerently. That is, it is common knowledge that people have diﬀerent opin-
ions and believe in the validity of their own judgements. In the present paper,
diﬀerences of opinions in the population of experts are not analyzed, but they
can be consistent with a decision-maker who can only appraise subjectively how
much reliable the forecasts of an expert are, when that expert is drawn from a
population of opinionated agents.
Finally, the issue of trust between decision-maker and expert can be related
to the issue of leadership. In Hermalin (1998) leadership is distinguished from
authority because following a leader is a voluntary, rather than coerced, ac-
tivity of the followers. In particular, in Hermalin leadership is the capacity of
the leader to induce rational agents to exert eﬀort when the leader can have
incentives to mislead them. But leadership can spring also from the high regard
into which subordinates take the competence of a manager. When subordinates
receive instructions beyond their scope of direct observation or understanding,
they will face the same situation of a decision-maker weighting the opinion of
an expert. In this sense, while the theory of yes-men of Prendergast (1993) is
7Morris (1974, p.1238):
Suppose a decision maker is considering the weather to determine the
prospects for a picnic. His view is that there is a 50-50 chance of rain....While he
is waiting for the weather report he ponders how he will use the weatherman’s
advice. He ﬁrst reason that the weatherman will state a probability of rain p...
The decision maker ... makes a subjective appraisal of the dependence between
the expert’s advice and the actual weather. Speciﬁcally, he asks himself what his
assessment of p would be if an honest clairvoyant told him that it will surely rain
on his picnic...For any given value of p he can calculate the posterior probability
of rain...
8According to Lindley (1982), an expert is probability calibrated if the decision maker
adopts the expert’s opinion for his own. Other concepts of calibration are discussed by
DeGroot-Fienberg (1983).
7concerned with the reliability that a manager expects to characterize the re-
ports from his subordinates, a complementary issue can regard the reliability
that subordinates expect to characterize the guidelines issued by their manager.
3 Set-up
For two periods a decision-maker and an expert, denoted by D and E respec-
tively, are engaged in a joint activity. That joint activity yields a common payoﬀ
at every period. The payoﬀ at period t depends on the state of the world at
period t, denoted by ωt, and the action chosen at period t, denoted by at. Both
agents aim at maximizing the undiscounted sum of the per-period payoﬀs of
their joint activity.
At every period the state of the world can be either −1 (low state) or 1 (high
state). At every period the feasible action set A is the closed interval [−1,1] of
the real line. The common payoﬀ function at period t, denoted by πt (ωt,at), is
the quadratic loss function, i.e.:
πt (ωt,at) = −(ωt − at)
2 (1)
Then a best action is always implementable for every expected current payoﬀ.
At the beginning of every period the expert makes an assessment of the
probability that the current state is low. Let pt denote the expert’s true belief
that ωt is low, with pt in the closed unit interval of the real line, denoted by
I. During period t the expert sends a message, denoted by mt, to the decision-
maker. Every message mt belongs to I and can be interpreted as the expert’s
announced probability that the current state is low. Having received mt, the
decision-maker updates his probability that ωt is low, and chooses the current
action at.
The beliefs of the expert are assumed to satisfy the following conditions9:
a) a belief pt is formed at period t before any message mt is sent; b) if the
expert has belief pt, pt will represent his degree of conﬁdence in the event "ωt
is low", i.e. the expert believes pt to be unbiased; and c) at period (t − 1) the
expert expects that in the future he can have any belief pt in I with positive
probability. For simplicity, it is assumed that the prior joint probability density
function (p.d.f.) of p1 and p2 is represented by [f (p)]
2, where f (p) is the uniform
p.d.f.. Hence, the ﬁnal beliefs of the expert are stochastically independent from
his initial beliefs.
The decision-maker believes that each state occurs with equal prior prob-
ability, and that the states are stochastically independent across time. The
decision-maker considers the true beliefs of the expert as the realizations of an
experiment with an unknown parameter labelled η. In particular, the decision-
maker considers the true belief pt of the expert as the outcome of the random
variable Pt in the sample space I, having a p.d.f. conditional on the true state
9The process by which the expert comes to have his beliefs is not modelled. The main
reasons are the following: a) diﬀerent experts may have diﬀerent opinions, and b) the decision-
maker is unaware of the inferences that an expert can make.
8and the unknown parameter η. Moreover, the decision-maker believes that the
true beliefs of the expert at diﬀerent times form a random sample: provided the
true states ω1 and ω2 are equal to ω, the true beliefs P1 and P2 are i.i.d. with
common likelihood function l(p | ω,η).
The parameter η is assumed to belong to the closed unit interval of the real
line. The likelihood functions related to the lowest and the highest parameters
are the following:
l(p | −1,0) = 2p = l(1 − p | 1,0) ∀p ∈ I (2)
l(p | −1,1) = 1 = l(p | 1,1) ∀p ∈ I
When η is zero, the likelihood of p, conditional on a low (high) state, is lin-
early increasing (decreasing) in p. When η is the highest, the likelihood of p
conditional on state ω is uniform. For every parameter η in (0,1) the likelihood
function l(p | ω,η) is assumed to be the following:
l(p | ω,η) = (1 − η)l(p | ω,0) + ηl(p | ω,1) ω = −1,1 (3)
i.e. the likelihood function l(p | ω,η) is a linear mixture of the experiments
characterized by the extreme values that η can take. The parameter η is a
measure of statistical bias for the following reason. Let u(−1 | p,η) denote the
decision-maker’s posterior probability that ω is low conditional on p and η, i.e.:
u(−1 | p,η) =
l(p | −1,η)
l(p | −1,η) + l(p | 1,η)
(4)
That is, u(−1 | p,η) would be the decision-maker’s posterior belief that the
current state is low, if messages could not be other than honest, and if the
decision-maker believed that the expert’s forecasts were characterized by pa-
rameter η with certainty. From (2)-(3), if ηj > ηi, then | p − u(−1 | p,ηi)| ≤    p − u
 
−1 | p,ηj
     for every p in I. In other words, the lower is η, the smaller
will be the distance between the decision-maker’s posterior beliefs and the ex-
pert’s true beliefs. The higher is η, the greater will be the correction deemed to
be right by the decision-maker over the expert’s forecasts. The decision-maker
would adopt the honest opinions of the expert for his own if he were certain
that η is equal to 0 (i.e. the expert is reputed to be perfectly calibrated). The
decision-maker would be indiﬀerent to the expert’s reports if he were certain
that the expert is perfectly unreliable (i.e. η = 1). It follows that the parame-
ter η measures the systematic error that aﬀects the true beliefs of the expert
according to the decision-maker.
To sum up, the uncertainty of the decision-maker is substantial for two
reasons. First, the decision-maker cannot be more uncertain about the current
state than at the beginning of every period, since his prior probability that
the current state is low is 0.5. Second, the decision-maker looks at the expert
as a source of forecasts with a systematic and unknown error represented by
the parameter η. At the initial period the decision-maker believes the expert’s
parameter η to be a drawing from the distribution function (d.f.) G1 of η, with
9corresponding generalized probability density function10 (g.p.d.f.) g1 of η on
I. It is assumed that under the g.p.d.f. g1 of η both the expected value of η,
denoted by η1, and the variance of η, denoted by σ2, exist. The support of
g1 ( ), denoted by H1, is assumed to be non-singular in (0,1] 11. After action
a1 has been implemented, both the common payoﬀ and the state at period 1
are realized and publicly observed. Then the game is played again by the same
agents with new predictions and a new state, a new message, a new g.p.d.f. of
η and a new action.
All aspects of the game except (p1,p2) are common knowledge. The game
solution concept is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
4 Message Rule for One Period Ahead
I begin the analysis with a discussion of the last stage. Let g2 (η) be the short
notation for the g.p.d.f. of η conditional on ω1 and m1, with support denoted
by H2 and corresponding expected bias denoted by η2. The expert will choose
a period-2 message rule that is a g.p.d.f. of m2 conditional on his true belief p2,
denoted by  (m2 | p2), with
 
I  (m2 | p2)dm2 = 1. Let β (m2 | p2) denote the
decision-maker’s period-2 belief that the expert announces m2, conditional on
p2, with
 
I β(m2 | p2)dm2 = 1. Finally, let ν (m2) denote the decision-maker’s









I [l(p2 | −1,η) + l(p2 | 1,η)]β (m2 | p2)g2 (η)dp2dη
(5)
For brevity, sometimes I will call ν (m2) the decision-maker’s induced posterior
belief, meaning that it is the posterior probability that ω2 is low to which
the decision-maker is lead by the expert sending m2. The decision-maker will
choose a period-2 action rule that is a g.p.d.f. of a2 conditional on m2, denoted
by α(a2 | m2), with
 
A α(a2 | m2)da2 = 1.
In equilibrium:
a) if    (m′
2 | p2) > 0, then m′
2 solves maxm2 EE [π2 (ω2,   α(a2 | m2)) | p2],
where EE [π2 ( ) | p2] denotes the payoﬀ at period 2 expected by the expert
having belief p2;
b) if   α(a′
2 | m2) > 0, then a′
2 solves maxa2 ED [π2 (ω2,a2) |   ν (m2)] where
ED [π2 ( ) |   ν (m2)] denotes the payoﬀ at period 2 expected by the decision-
maker who has received message m2;
c) if
 
I    (m′
2 | p2)dp2 > 0, then    (m′
2 | p2) =   β(m′
2 | p2) for every p2.
Conditions a) and b) describe a Nash Bayesian equilibrium at period 2.
Condition c) says that the decision-maker’s period-2 beliefs {β (m2 | p2)}, and,
consequently, his posterior probabilities {ν (m2)} are to be consistent with the
expert’s period-2 message rules in equilibrium.
10The adjective "generalized" is used in order to deal with a d.f. of η that can be a discrite
distribution, a continuous distribution or a mixture of the two.
11Otherwise the d.f. of η could be degenerate.
10The following Proposition shows that the decision-maker will never adopt
mixed strategies at period 2. Moreover, the expert will not report his true beliefs
in equilibrium at the ﬁnal stage of play.
Proposition 1 : the decision-maker’s best action   a2 conditional on m2 is a
strictly monotonic function of ν ( ). Provided η2 ∈ (0,1), truthtelling will never
be the expert’s period-2 equilibrium message rule.
Truthtelling cannot be supported in equilibrium at period 2 for the following
reason. The decision-maker’s best ﬁnal action depends on his posterior probabil-
ity that the current state is low. When the decision-maker expects the expert to
be honest but biased, the decision-maker’s induced posterior belief will typically
be diﬀerent from the belief of that honest expert. If the agents show diﬀerent
degrees of conﬁdence in the event "the current state is low", they will disagree
about the expected single-period payoﬀ, and the best action to implement. Con-
sequently, the single-period payoﬀ expected by the expert will be decreasing in
the distance between his true belief and the decision-maker’s induced posterior
belief. In other words, the expert will have an interest in leading the decision-
maker to believe what he believes. When the decision-maker conjectures that
the messages are honest, the expert will misreport in order to squeeze the gap
between his true belief and the decision-maker induced posterior belief.
In particular, misreporting will work in the following direction: if the ex-
pert believes that a high state is more likely (i.e. p2 > 0.5), he will send a
message m2 higher than p2; instead, if the expert is conﬁdent that a low state
will occur, he will announce a probability m2 lower than p2. In other words, if
the decision-maker believes that the reports are honest, the expert will exagger-
ate his announcements in order to make the decision-maker’s induced posterior
probability closer to his true belief. Moreover, given two distribution functions
of η, G′
2 and G′′
2, if the d.f. G′
2 dominates the d.f. G′′
2 in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance, then the decision-maker’s induced posterior beliefs will
be less reactive to the messages sent by the expert under the d.f. G′
2 than under
the d.f. G′′
2. As a result, the worse is the reputation of the expert, measured
by the bias expected by the decision-maker, the stronger will be the intensity
of misreporting.
From Proposition 1 the decision-maker’s posterior probability ν (m2) can-
not be a continuous function of m2 in equilibrium at the ﬁnal stage of play.
Now, in order to characterize period-2 equilibria with non-continuous posterior
probabilities {ν (m2)}, I need to proceed in the following way:
1) ﬁx a g.p.d.f. g2 of η and a system of period-2 beliefs {β (m2 | p2)} of the
decision-maker that generate n2 diﬀerent posterior probabilities {ν (m2)}. Let
Vn2 denote the correspondent ordered set of period-2 posterior probabilities, i.e.
Vn2 =
 
νi | ν(i−1) < νi < ν(i+1)
 
.
2) Once a set Vn2 has been speciﬁed, let P (Vn2) denote the set of the elements
{Yi} deﬁned in the following way:
Yi = {p2 | |p2 − νi| ≤ |p2 − νj| ∀νj ∈ Vn2\νi} (6)
11By construction, ∪Yi = I. From the proof of Proposition 1, if p2 belongs to Yi,
then the payoﬀ at period-2 expected by the expert with belief p2 from inducing
νi will not be lower than the payoﬀ at period-2 expected by the same agent
from inducing any other νj (i.e. EE [π2 (ω2,  a(νi)) − π2 (ω2,  a(νj)) | p2] ≥ 0
for every νj ∈ Vn2\νi if p2 ∈ Yi, where   a(νi) stands for the decision-maker’s
best ﬁnal action conditional on message m2 inducing νi).
The following Proposition shows that equilibria at the ﬁnal stage of play
always exist. In particular:
Proposition 2 :
a) provided η2 ∈ [0,1), for every integer n2 there will be a unique period-2




, that is a partition
with n2 elements, thereby simply denoted by   Pn2. For every n2 > 1, both   Vn2
and   Pn2 will be symmetric around 0.5.   Vn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 1,
while   Pn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 2.
b) Provided η2 = 1, there will be a unique period-2 equilibrium set   V1 and a









Proposition 2 shows that the equilibria at the ﬁnal stage of play are parti-
tional, similarly to the result of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Since the expert
believes in the validity of his own forecast, his reports will depend on his true be-
liefs only. In equilibrium every posterior probability   vi in   Vn2 can be computed
as if the expert chose a uniform message rule for every interval in the equilibrium
partition. The equilibrium sets   Vn2 and   Pn2 with more than one element are
shown to be symmetric around 0.5. Moreover, given an interval   Yi =
 
  y(i−1),  yi
 
that belongs to the equilibrium partition   Pn2, its size (i.e.
 
  yi −   y(i−1)
 
) will
be constant for every i only if the expert is reputed to be perfectly reliable.
Otherwise, the size of each interval   Yi in   Pn2will be decreasing in i from 1 to
n2
2 . Consequently, both the equilibrium sets   Vn2 and   Pn2 will be function of the
bias expected by the decision-maker at the ﬁnal stage of play.
Unlike the usual outcomes of cheap-talk games, Proposition 2 shows that an
equilibrium partition with cardinality n2 exists and is unique for every ﬁnite n2,
as long as the decision-maker does not expect the expert to be totally unreliable
(i.e. the g.p.d.f. g2 (η) is not degenerate on 1).The existence of an equilibrium
partition for every ﬁnite cardinality n2 is due to the following reason. The action
that the expert would freely choose (his unconstrained best action), and the
action that the expert both prefers and can actually induce the decision-maker to
make are usually diﬀerent. That diﬀerence between the expert’s best action and
the expert’s preferred action within the decision-maker’s best actions at period
2 has not always the same sign in the present paper, as it occurs in Crawford
and Sobel instead. Cheap-talk games are often marked by some "monotonic"
conﬂict of interest between the agents: for every state of the world the expert’s
unconstrained best action is always higher or lower than the decision-maker’s
best action. In the present paper the problem lies with a conﬂict of opinions
12between the agents: the decision-maker will choose an action that can be higher
or lower than the expert’s unconstrained best action. That feature is essential in
yielding the result of no ﬁnite upper bound to the equilibrium partitions at the
second stage, in contrast with the outcomes of cheap-talk games à la Crawford
and Sobel.
Since an equilibrium exists for every ﬁnite cardinality n2, the higher is the
number of messages to which the decision-maker associates a diﬀerent posterior
probability that the current state is low, the ﬁner will be the equilibrium parti-
tion at period 2. Thus, provided the expert is reputed to have some reliability at
period 2 (i.e. η2 < 1), multiple equilibria will prevail at period 2. Instead, if the
expert is reputed to be totally unreliable (i.e. η2 = 1), the unique equilibrium
will be the babbling equilibrium.
The following Corollary leads to show that at the end of period 1, ﬁxed
the cardinality of the partition supporting the expert’s message rules, the ﬁnal
payoﬀs expected by both the agents in equilibrium will never be the highest, if
n2 > 2 and η2 ∈ (0,1). That is:
Corollary 1 : let Ei [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] denote the payoﬀ at period 2 expected
by agent i at the end of period 1 when P (Vn2) is a partition with cardinality n2
and each vi in Vn2 is consistent with a uniform message rule for every interval
in P (Vn2). Provided η2 ∈ [0,1), Ei [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] will be maximized if the
size of every Yi is equal to 1
n2.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show that at the ﬁnal stage of play both the
agents would be better oﬀ if the expert could commit to message rules diﬀerent
from the equilibrium ones, notwithstanding a partition with n2 elements. In
other words, in equilibrium the expert’s incentive to misreport will reduce both
the agents’ expected ﬁnal payoﬀs.
Let   Rn2 denote the unique couple of the equilibrium sets   Vn2 and   Pn2.
Period-2 equilibria characterized by   Rn2 can be distinguished only with respect
to the decision-maker’s beliefs {β (m1 | p1)} for messages that are never sent by
the expert in equilibrium. The following Corollary is concerned with the rela-
tionship between the bias expected by the decision-maker at period 2 and the
payoﬀ at the ﬁnal stage expected by the expert at an equilibrium characterized
by   Rn2.
Corollary 2 : at the end of period 1, the future payoﬀ expected by the expert
at every non-babbling equilibrium is strictly decreasing and concave in η2.
Corollary 2 shows that, if n2 is greater than 2, the higher is the decision-
maker’s expected bias at period 2, the greater will be the size of   Y1 and   Yn2 in the
equilibrium partition   Pn2, while the the size of all the other intervals will squeeze.
As a consequence, every interval   Yi in the equilibrium partition   Pn2 with i  =
{1,n2}, will shift towards 0.5 as the reputation of the expert deteriorates. The
reason is that the expert’s incentive to induce the lowest or the highest posterior
beliefs, v1 or vn2, will increase with the decision-maker’s expected bias at period
132. At the end of period 1, the future payoﬀ expected by the expert at every
non-babbling ﬁnal equilibrium will decrease with the expected distance between
his true belief and the decision-maker’s induced posterior probability that ω2 is
low. Hence, the equilibrium future payoﬀ expected by the expert at the end of
period 1 will increase if his reputation improves (i.e. η2 gets lower than η1).
Since in correspondence to every non-babbling equilibrium at period 2 the
expert’s expected payoﬀ depends on η2 ultimately, the expert will have an instru-
mental reputational concern at period 1. The message that the expert chooses
to send at period 1 will have both a direct eﬀect on his expected current payoﬀ,
and an indirect eﬀect on his expected future payoﬀ. The direct eﬀect comes
from message m1 bringing the decision-maker to choose a particular current ac-
tion. The indirect eﬀect comes from message m1 causing a positive or negative
change in the expert’s reputation, relevant for the second round of play.
5 Message Rules for Two Periods Ahead
The expert will choose a period-1 message rule that is a g.p.d.f. of m1 condi-
tional on his true belief p1, denoted by  (m1 | p1), with
 
I  (m1 | p1)dm1 = 1.
Let β (m1 | p1) denote the decision-maker’s period-1 belief that the expert an-
nounces m1, conditional on p1, with
 
I β(m1 | p1)dm1 = 1. Let gc
2 (η | ω1,m1)
denote the decision-maker’s posterior g.p.d.f of η at period 2, conditional on ω1
and m1, and consistent with β (m1 | p1), i.e.:
gc
2 (η | ω1,m1) =
 
I l(p1 | η,ω1)β (m1 | p1)g1 (η)dp1  
H1
 
I l(p1 | η,ω1)β (m1 | p1)g1 (η)dp1dη
(7)
with corresponding expected bias denoted by ηc
2 (ω1,m1). Finally, let λ(m1)
denote the decision-maker’s period-1 posterior probability that ω1 is low, con-









I [l(p1 | −1,η) + l(p1 | 1,η)]β (m1 | p1)g1 (η)dp1dη
(8)
The decision-maker will choose a period-1 action rule that is a g.p.d.f. of a1
conditional on m1, denoted by α(a1 | m1), with
 
A α(a1 | m1)da1 = 1.
From Proposition 2 and Corollary 2, a ﬁnal equilibrium can depend on the
bias expected by the decision-maker at period 2. I underline that dependence
with the notation Rn2 (ηc
2 (ω1,m1)). I restrict attention to proﬁles of period-2
equilibria characterized by cardinality n2 whatever the realized state at period
1, i.e.   Rc
n2 (m1) =
 
  Rn2 (ηc
2 (−1,m1)),   Rn2 (ηc
2 (1,m1))
 
. Let   Rc
n2 denote the






a) if    (m′
1 | p1) > 0, then m′
1 solves maxm1EE
 








where EE [π1 ( ) + π2 ( ) | p1] denotes the sum of the payoﬀs expected by the ex-
pert who has belief p1 and sends message m1, when the equilibrium ﬁnal proﬁle
is   Rc
n2 (m1);
14b) if   α(a′
1 | m1) > 0, then a′
1 solves maxa1ED
 








where ED [π1 ( ) + π2 ( ) | λ(m1)] denotes the sum of the payoﬀs expected by the
decision-maker who has received message m1, when the equilibrium ﬁnal proﬁle




I    (m′
1 | p1)dp1 > 0, then    (m′
1 | p1) =   β(m′
1 | p1) for every p1.
Conditions a) and b) describe a Nash Bayesian equilibrium at period 1.
Condition c) says that the decision-maker’s period-1 beliefs {β (m1 | p1)} are to
be consistent with the expert’s period-1 message rules in equilibrium. It fol-








2 (η | ω1,m1)
 
need be consistent with the
expert’s equilibrium initial message rules as well.
The following Lemma shows that the decision-maker will not adopt mixed
strategies even at period 1. Moreover, truthtelling at the ﬁrst stage of play
cannot not be supported in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 : the decision-maker’s best action   a1 conditional on m1 is a strictly
monotonic function of λ( ). Truthtelling will never be the expert’s period-1
equilibrium message rule.
Lemma 1 shows that at period 1 the decision-maker’s best actions will be
strictly decreasing in his posterior probability that the state at period 1 is low.
Moreover, the decision-maker’s best initial actions are independent from the
equilibrium partition at the ﬁnal stage of play. Indeed, it is the expert’s future
reputation that links his expected payoﬀ at period 1 with the his expected future
payoﬀ, but the expert’s future reputation is independent from the decision-
maker’s initial action. Moreover, Lemma 1 shows that honest reports at period
1 cannot be supported in equilibrium for every equilibrium proﬁle at the ﬁnal
stage of play.
In order to characterize equilibria with non-continuous initial action rules, I
need to proceed in the following way. Fix a system of period-1 beliefs {β (m1 | p1)}
of the decision-maker, that generates n1 diﬀerent posterior probabilities {λ(m1)}.
Let Ln1 denote the correspondent ordered set of period-1 posterior probabilities,
i.e.: Ln1 =
 
λi | λ(i−1) < λi < λ(i+1)
 
. The following Lemma shows that the
decision maker will expect the same bias at period 2 in correspondence to all
the diﬀerent messages at period 1 that induce an equal posterior probability at
period 1, i.e.:


















Lemma 2 shows that there is a correspondence between the cardinality of
the set of the initial posterior probabilities {λi} and the cardinality of the sets
of the ﬁnal expected biases. In other words, given Ln1, there will be n1 dif-
ferent expected biases at period 2, conditional on each realized state ω1. Let
ηc
2 (ω1,i) denote the expected ﬁnal bias conditional on ω1 and any message m1
15inducing λi. Let   Rc
n2 (i) denote the period-2 equilibrium proﬁle with cardinality




  Rn2 (ηc
2 (−1,i)),   Rn2 (ηc
2 (1,i))
 
). Given a set Ln1 and the corre-
sponding equilibrium set   Rc
n2, let Q
 
Ln1   Rc
n2
 
denote the set of the elements








π1 (ω1,  a1 (λi)) + π2
 




−π1 (ω1,  a1 (λj)) − π2
 
  Rn2 (ηc
2 (ω1,j))








where   a1 (λi) stands for the decision-maker’s best initial action conditional on
message m1 inducing λi. If p1 belongs to Qi in (9), then the sum of the payoﬀs
expected by the expert with belief p1 from inducing λi will not be lower than
the sum of the payoﬀs expected by the expert from inducing any other λj. By
construction, ∪Qi = I.












The set Q1 (Ln1) would be relevant if the agents played a single-stage game.
The following Lemma shows that in equilibrium the set Q
 




be a partition with n1 elements.
Lemma 3 : given i < j, if Qi and Qj are non-empty elements of Q
 




then any p1 in Qi cannot be higher than any p1 in Qj.
From Lemma 3, if the set Q
 
Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
is a partition with n1 elements, then















  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 




n1,   Q1
n1
 
, denoted by   S1
n1. The following Propo-
sition shows that instrumental reputational concerns will never make the equi-


















for every i = E,D if n1 ≤ 2

















for every i = E,D if n1 > 2 and
n2 > 1.
16Proposition 3 is concerned with equilibria characterized by an equilibrium
set Q
 
  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
that is partition with the same cardinality of the equilibrium
set   Ln1. In that case every   Qi in Q
 
  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
is a proper interval
 
  q(i−1),   qi
 
.
Moreover, both the equilibrium sets   Ln1 and Q
 




ric around 0.5. Proposition 3 shows that in equilibrium the posterior distri-
bution functions of η can be ordered according to the criterion of ﬁrst order
statistical dominance. That is, the d.f.   G(η | −1,i) will dominate the d.f.
  Gc (η | −1,(i + 1)). Hence, if the true state at period 1 is low and the expert
induces   λi, his reputation at period 2 will be worse than it would have occurred
if he had induced   λ(i+1). The opposite will obtain if the true state at period
1 is high. Moreover, if   qi < 0.5, the d.f.   Gc (η | −1,i) will dominate the d.f.
  Gc (η | 1,i). In that case, if the expert induces   λi, his future reputation will
improve with respect to the expected current bias if the true state at period 1
is high.
When the diﬀerence in the expert’s expected current payoﬀ if he induces
  λi instead of   λ(i+1) is positive, I will call that diﬀerence the expert’s expected
current advantage from   λi. Analogously, when the diﬀerence in the expert’s
expected future payoﬀ if he induces   λ(i+1) instead of   λi is positive, I will call
that diﬀerence the expert’s expected future advantage from   λ(i+1). When p1
belongs to   Qi and   qi < 0.5, then the expert’s expected current advantage from
  λi will never be lower than the diﬀerence in the expert’s expected future payoﬀ
if he induces   λ(i+1) instead of   λi. When p1 =   qi, the expert’s expected current
advantage from   λi will be equal to the expert’s expected future advantage from
  λ(i+1). It means that in equilibrium, when p1 belongs to   Qi and   qi < 0.5, the
expert’s reputational concern at period 1 will reduce his incentive to announce
an exaggeratingly low probability that the current state is low. Instead, when
p1 belongs to   Qi and   qi > 0.5, then the expert’s expected future advantage from
  λi will never be lower than the diﬀerence in the expert’s expected current payoﬀ
if he induces   λ(i+1) instead of   λi. When p1 =   qi, the expert’s expected future
advantage from   λi will be equal to the expert’s expected current advantage from
  λ(i+1). It means that in equilibrium, when p1 belongs to   Qi and   qi > 0.5, the
expert’s reputational concern at period 1 will partially oﬀset his incentive to
misreport an exaggeratingly high probability that the current state is low. So,
reputational concerns at period 1 will imply a trade-oﬀ between two conﬂicting
purposes:
1) on one side, the current payoﬀ expected by the expert will increase as
the gap between the expert’s current belief and the decision-maker’s posterior
belief at period 1 shrinks. That argument would result in noisy current messages,
inﬂated towards the tails of the distribution.
2) On the other side, the more extreme are the initial announcements of the
expert, the higher will be his expected future loss driven by a reduced reputation,
when he is suﬃciently uncertain about the current state.
17Proposition 3 shows that the higher is the variance of η at period 1, the
stronger will be the impact of reputational concerns at period 1 in equilibrium.
So the intervals in Q
 
  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
will be distributed more evenly than the in-
tervals in   Q1
n1. From Corollary 1, the initial payoﬀs expected ex-ante by both
the agents will be maximized if all the intervals in the initial partition have
the same size. It follows that reputational concerns at period 1 can improve
the equilibrium payoﬀ at period 1 expected by both the agents. To sum up,
repeated interaction will make the expert concerned with his future reputation.
As a result, messages at period 1 will be less noisy than they would be in a
single-stage game. All the agents will gain from reputational concerns.
6 Conclusions
The paper is concerned with the repeated interaction between a decision-maker
and an expert of uncertain reliability. The distinctive assumption of the paper
is that the decision-maker makes a subjective assessment of the bias aﬀecting
the true opinions of the expert. The distinctive result of the paper is that
reputational concerns at the ﬁrst stage will increase the credibility of the initial
messages. Thereby reputational concerns will improve the equilibrium welfare
properties at the initial round of play.
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8 Appendix




ED [π2 (ω2,a2) | ν (m2)] = [1 − 2ν (m2)] (11)
19Let   a2 (ν (m2)) denote the function mapping agent D’s period-2 posterior prob-
ability into his best current action. Hence, if ν (m′
2) < ν (m′′
2), then   a2 (ν (m′
2))
>   a2 (ν (m′′
2)).
Since (1 − 2p2) = argmaxA EE [π2 (ω2,a2) | p2], then, from (11), agent E’s
best choice at the ﬁnal period, conditional on p2, will be the announcement of
a message m′
2 that solves minm2 |p2 − ν (m2)|.
Suppose that agent D believes that agent E will report his true belief at
period 2. In that case, agent D’s period-2 beliefs will be such that:
∗




v(m2) denote agent D’s period-2 posterior probability that ω2 is low, under
the system of beliefs in (12).

























  if ηi < ηj and p′′ > p′
-) (1 − m2)
 
H2 l(m2 | −1,η)g2 (η)dη > m2
 
H2 l(m2 | 1,η)g2 (η)dη if m2 ∈
[0,0.5).
The last inequality will be reversed if m2 ∈ (0.5,1]. So
∗
v(m2) will be greater
than m2 if m2 ∈ [0,0.5), and it will be lower than m2 if m2 ∈ (0.5,1]. Then,      p2 −
∗
v(m2)
      will be:
-) strictly increasing in m2 if p2 <
∗
v(0),












-) strictly decreasing in m2 if p2 >
∗
v (1).
Hence, the following period-2 message rule will be optimal for agent E:

























Accordingly, m2  = p2 for every p2  = {0,0.5,1}. Moreover, if two distri-
bution functions, G′
2 (η) and G′′
2 (η), are such G′
2 (η) dominates G′′
2 (η) in the
sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, then
∗
v(m2 | g′
2 (η)) will be lower than
∗
v(m2 | g′′
2 (η)) for every m2 < 0.5; the inequality will be reversed for every
m2 > 0.5.
b) Suppose η2 = 1. From (2) and (4),
∗
v(m2) = 0.5 for every m2. Then,      p2 −
∗
v(m2)
      will be invariant with respect to m2, and truthtelling can be sup-
ported in equilibrium.
20c) Suppose η2 = 0. From (2) and (4),
∗
v(m2) = m2 for every m2. Then,      p2 −
∗
v(m2)
      will be zero only if m2 = p2, and truthtelling can be supported in
equilibrium.
Proof. of Proposition 2
a) Consider a set Vn2 with n2 ﬁnite and greater than 1. From (13):
1 >
∗











for every i from 1 to (n2 − 2), from (6)





i = 1,..,n2 y0 = 0 yn2 = 1 (14)




∀i ∈ {1,..,(n2 − 1)}





b) Properties of period-2 equilibria.
b.1) Suppose that in equilibrium at period 2 the equilibrium set   Vn2 has
ﬁnite cardinality n2 and is supported by the system of equilibrium message
rules {   (m2 | p2)}. I want to show that the elements of the equilibrium set   Vn2
are such that:












  yi +   y(i−1)
 
(1 − η2) + η2
2
∀i ∈ {1,..,n2}
Let   Mi denote the subset of messages inducing   vi under   Vn2. Since n2 is ﬁnite,
there must be some   vx with non-singular   Mx. Let   M+
x denote the subset of   Mx,
collecting all the messages in the support of period-2 equilibrium message rule
   (m2 | p2) conditional on p2 in   Yx. If   M+
x is singular, then   vx will satisfy (15).
Suppose   M+
x to be non-singular. In that case, for every m′
2 and m′′
2 in   M+
x :
  ν (m′
2) −   ν (m′′
2) = (16)









  β (m′
2 | p2)dy
−













   (m′
2 | p2)  
￿ Yi    (m′
2 | p2)dy
−
   (m′′
2 | p2)  








   (m2 | p2) = 1 ∀p2 ∈
 
  y(x−1),  yx
 
(17)
Now consider the following modiﬁed period-2 message rule:
   (m2 | p2) =    (m2 | p2) ∀ m2 / ∈   M+
x and p2 / ∈
 
  y(x−1),   yx
 
(18)
   (m2 | p2) =
1        M
+
x
     
∀ m2 ∈   M+
x and p2 ∈
 
  y(x−1),  yx
 
21From (17), under (18) :
   (m′
2 | p2)  
















2 ∈   M+
x and p2 ∈
 
  y(x−1),  yx
 
Let   v (m2) denote agent D’s period-2 posterior probability that ω2 is low con-
ditional on m2 ∈   M+
x and (18). Given m′
2 in   M+
x , from (16):
[  v(m′


















   (m2 | p2)  
￿ Yi    (m2 | y)dy
−
   (m′
2 | p2)  






Consequently, if an equilibrium set   Vn2 exists, it can be supported by the mes-
sage rule in (18) that implies (15).
b.2) Suppose η2 ∈ [0,1) and n2 > 1. From (15), if   Vn2 is an equilibrium set,
then the equilibrium vector   y￿ Vn2 will satisfy the following conditions:
-)   y￿ Vn2 is a solution to the system f (yn2,η2) of (n2 − 1) equations where













with i ∈ {1,...,(n2 − 1)}, y0 = 0, yn2 = 1.
-)   y￿ Vn2 is such that:
0 <   y1 <   y2 < ... <   y(n2−2) <   y(n2−1) < 1 (20)
From (19),   yi =
 
1 −   y(n2−i)
 
and, from (16),   vi =
 
1 −   v(n2+1−i)
 
. Hence,




and   Vn2 will be symmetric around 0.5.
c) Existence of period-2 equilibria.
c.1) Suppose η2 ∈ [0,1). I want to show that there exists a unique equilib-
rium set   Vn2 of cardinality n2 for every ﬁnite n2. If n2 = 1, there will be a





= I (the babbling equilibrium). If n2 > 1, since
1−η2
2(1+η2) is positive,
the system f (yn2,η2) of (n2 − 1) equations from (19) can be written in matrix
notation in the following way:
Zy
′













2(1+η2) 0 0 0
0 ... ... ... ... 0


















The matrix Z is invertible and every entry z−1
ij of Z−1 is strictly positive. Hence,
there will always exist a unique vector   yn2such that   y′
n2 = Z−1e′. Moreover,
the vector   yn2 will satisfy (20). It follows that the solution   yn2 is the unique
equilibrium vector   y￿ Vn2, thereby simply denoted by   yn2.
Finally,
 
  yi −   y(i−1)
 
will be decreasing in i for i ≤ n2
2 if η2 ∈ (0,1). If
η2 = 0, then   yi = i
n2. Hence,   Pn2 will be a function of η2 if n2 > 2, while   Vn2
will be a function of η2 if n2 > 1.
c.2) Suppose η2 = 1. The only equilibrium set is   V1, with   V1 = 0.5, and the
unique equilibrium partition is P1 = I.
Proof. of Corollary 1
EE [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] and ED [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] will be equal to:
-) when n2 is an even integer:














with oE = −
3+η2
2





, oD = −
(3−η2)(1+η2)
4 , and uD = 2(1 − η2)
2
-) when n2 is an odd integer:
EE [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] = −1+uE









1 − y n2−1
2
 2 
ED [π2 (Vn2,P (Vn2))] = −1+uD









1 − y n2−1
2
 2 
Proof. of Corollary 2
From Proposition 2,   Pn2 will be independent of η2 if n2 ≤ 2, while   Vn2 will
be independent of η2 if n2 = 1.
Consider   Rn2 with n2 > 2. From (19) and (21) − (22):
-) Dyf (  yn2,η2) = Z
-) Dη2f (  yn2,η2) = −ρ−2  
1 −   y2,1 −   y1 −   y3,...,1 −   y(n2−3) −   y(n2−1),−  y(n2−2)
 ′,
where ρ = (1 + η2).
From the implicit function theorem, Df (  yn2,η2) = −Z−1Dη2f (  yn2,η2).
Since   yn2 is symmetric around 0.5, then:












dη2 for i ≤ n2
2 so that
 
  yi −   y(i−1)
 
will be decreasing







denote the following system of (n2 − 1) equations where


























1 − y(i−1) − y(i+1)
ρ2 = 0

















1 − ˜ y2 + ρ
d￿ y2






































2 > 0 for every
  yi < 0.5.
At the end of period 1, the equilibrium payoﬀ at period 2 expected by agent















j −   y2
(j−1)
 
(1 −   vj)
2 +
 
  yj −   y(j−1)
  













j −   y2
(j−1)
 
(1 −   vj)
2 +
 
  yj −   y(j−1)
  











when n2 is an odd integer.









decreasing and concave in η2, with
δEE[π2(￿ Rn2)|η2]
δη2 equal to 0 when η2 → 0.













= [1 − 2λ(m1)]
Let   a1 (λ(m1)) denote the function mapping agent D’s period-1 posterior prob-
ability into his best current action. If λ(m′
1) < λ(m′′
1), then   a1 (λ(m′
1)) >
  a1 (λ(m′′
1)).
Suppose that agent D believes that agent E will announce his true belief at
period 1. In that case, agent D’s period-1 beliefs will be such that:
∗
β (m1 | p1) =




λ(m1) denote agent D’s posterior probability at period 1 that ω1 is low
under the system of period-1 beliefs in (23). From (8),
∗
λ(m1) ∈ (0,1). Since
l(p | η,ω) is always positive for every positive η and for every ω, then g2 (η | ω1,m1)
will never be degenerate under (23) with η2 (ω1,m1) ∈ (0,1). From (7) and (23):
24-) η2 (−1,m1) = η1 + σ2 1−2m1
2m1(1−η1)+η1,
-) η2 (1,m1) = η1 − σ2 1−2m1
2(1−m1)(1−η1)+η1
Suppose n2 = 1 (i.e. babbling equilibrium at period 2). From Corollary 2,





























In that case the result of Proposition 1 can be shown to hold with respect to
agent E’s period-1 equilibrium message rule.
Suppose n2 > 1. Let   R∗
n2 (m1) characterize a period-2 equilibrium proﬁle
where the posterior generalized probability density functions of η are consistent


































  Rn2 (η∗
2 (−1,m1))
  




  Rn2 (η∗
2 (1,m1))
  
Hence, at period 1 the sum of the payoﬀs expected by agent E will be:
a) strictly decreasing in m1 for every p1 in some proper interval [0,p′
1]
b) strictly increasing in m1 for every p1 in some proper interval [p′′
1,1].
Consequently, agent D’s period-1 beliefs in (23) will be inconsistent with
agent E’s best period-1 message rule.
































































Proof. of Lemma 3
25a) Suppose n2 = 1. From Corollary 2, given a set Ln1, every subset Qi in
(9) will be equal to Q1
i in (10). In that case, an analogous version of (14) can
be shown to hold.
b) Suppose n2 > 1. Given any L1, the corresponding set Q
 






















































. Then, H(i,j) ∈ (0,1) for every
i < j. Let H(i) denote the lowest H(i,j) for every j > i, and let H(i) denote
the highest H(z,i) for every i > z. It follows that:
-) 0 < H(1) ≤ H(n1) < 1








if H(i) ≤ H(i), and H(i) ≤ H(j) if Qi,Qj  = ∅ and i < j.
Consequently, if n1 ≥ 2, for any set Ln1, the corresponding set Q
 
Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
will have 2 non-empty elements at least.
Proof. of Proposition 3





=   S1
n1.
b) Suppose n2 > 1. There always exists a unique   L1, with   L1 = 0.5 (the
period-1 babbling equilibrium).
Suppose that n1 > 1 and in equilibrium each   λi in   Ln1is induced with posi-
tive probability. In that case, from Lemma 3, the corresponding set Q
 
  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
will be a partition with cardinality n1 such that:
-)   Q1 = [0,H(1)] = [0,H(1,2)] = [0,  q1]




= [H(i − 1,i),H(i,i + 1)] = [  qi−1,   qi] for every i ∈
{2,...,(n1 − 2)}




= [H(n1 − 1,n1),1] = [  qn1−1,1].
Analogously to point b) of the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that:
  λi =
 
  qi +   q(i−1)
 
(1 − η1) + η1
2
∀  Qi, i ∈ {1,..,n1} (24)
Moreover, in equilibrium:
  gc
2 (η | ω1,i) =
g1 (η)
 




￿ Qi l(p1 | ω1,η)g1 (η)dp1dη
(25)
Since l(p | η,ω) is always positive for every positive η and for every ω, and
since |H1 ∩ (0,1]| ≥ 2, then   gc
2 (η | ω1,i) in (25) will never be degenerate with
ηc
2 (ω1,i) ∈ (0,1).







￿ Qj l(p1 | ω1,η)dp1
 



















2(ηk|−1,i) for every ηz,ηk ∈ H1, for every ηz < ηk.
The last inequality will be reversed if ω1 = 1. It follows that ηc
2 (−1,j) <
ηc
2 (−1,i) and ηc
2 (1,j) > ηc
2 (1,i). In particular:
-) ηc




2 (1,i) = η1 − σ2 1−￿ q(i−1)−￿ qi
(2−￿ q(i−1)−￿ qi)(1−η1)+η1
.
So, when i < j, then ηc
2 (1,i) < ηc
2 (1,j) ≤ η1 ≤ ηc
2 (−1,j) < ηc
2 (−1,i) if
  qj ≤ 0.5, while ηc
2 (−1,j) < ηc
2 (−1,i) ≤ η1 ≤ ηc
2 (1,i) < ηc
2 (1,j) if   q(i−1) ≥ 0.5.
Finally:
ηc
2 (1,i) = ηc
2 (−1,j) and ηc
2 (−1,i) = ηc
2 (1,j) (26)
if   q(i−1) = 1 −   qj and   qi = 1 −   q(j−1)
b.1) If n1 > 1 and   Ln1 is the support of agent E’s period-1 equilibrium
message rules, the corresponding equilibrium vector   q￿ Ln1 = (  q1,...,   qn1−1) will
satisfy the following conditions:































η1 − δ(1,i,(i + 1)) = 0
with i ∈ {1,...,(n1 − 1)}, q0 = 0, qn1 = 1.
-)   q￿ Ln1is such that:
0 <   q1 <   q2 < .... <   q(n1−2) <   q(n1−1) < 1 (28)
From (27) and (26),   qi =
 
1 −   q(n1−1)
 
, and, from (24),   λi =
 
1 −   λ(n1+1−i)
 
.
Hence, from (28), both Q
 
  Ln1,   Rc
n2
 
and   Ln1 will be symmetric around 0.5.
b.2) Every hi (qn1,z) in (27) can be written in the following way:
qiδ(−1,i,(i + 1)) + (1 − qi)δ(1,i,(i + 1)) (29)






(1 − η1) + η1 − qi (1 + η1)
 
Suppose n1 = 2. The RHS in (29) will be equal to zero if q1 = 0.5. From (26),
if q1 = 0.5, the LHS in (29) will be equal to zero. Hence, q1 = 0.5 is the unique
solution to the system in (27).
27Suppose n1 > 2. Consider qi < 0.5. Then, ηc
2 (−1,i) > ηc
2 (−1,(i + 1)) ≥
ηc
2 (1,(i + 1)) > ηc
2 (1,i). So, ηc
2 (ω1,(i + 1)) can be written as it follows:
ηc
2 (−1,(i + 1)) = xηc
2 (−1,i) + (1 − x)ηc
2 (1,i) (30)
ηc
2 (1,(i + 1)) = zηc












  Rn2 (ηc
2 (−1,i))
  
> 0. Let that diﬀerence
be denoted by w.





, the LHS in (29) will be strictly lower than
w[−qi (1 − x) + (1 − qi)z], that is negative from (30). Instead, the RHS in




for every   qi lower than 0.5.
b.3) Let ¨ z = (η1,0), and let ¨ qn1 be such that hi (¨ qn1,¨ z) = 0 for every
i ∈ {1,...,(n1 − 1)}. From the proof of Proposition 2, ¨ qn1 exists and is unique.
Moreover, from (27), the following matrix Dqn1h(¨ qn1,¨ z) is invertible:




γ¨ q2 ǫ¨ q2 0 0 0 0
ǫ(¨ q3 − ¨ q1) γ (¨ q3 − ¨ q1) ǫ(¨ q3 − ¨ q1) 0 0 0
0 ... ... ... ... 0
0 0 0 0 ǫ
 














and ǫ = −(1 − η1)
2. Since:




−(1 − ¨ q1)
ϑδ(1,1,2)
ϑσ2 − ¨ q1
ϑδ(−1,1,2)
ϑσ2
−(1 − ¨ q2)
ϑδ(1,2,3)






1 − ¨ q(n1−1)
  ϑδ(1,(n1−1),n1)







then Dh(¨ qn1,¨ z) = −
 
Dqn1h(¨ qn1,¨ z)
 −1 Dσ2h(¨ qn1,¨ z). Hence,
d¨ qi
dσ2 < 0 for
every ¨ qi < 0.5.
b.4) Let t = (η1,η1 (1 − η1)), where η1 (1 − η1) is the greatest variance com-
patible with η1. Consider ˙ t = (0,0) and let ˙ qn1 be such that hi
 
˙ qn1, ˙ t
 
= 0
for every i ∈ {1,...,(n1 − 1)}. From the proof of Proposition 2, ˙ qn1 exists and
is unique. Moreover, every ˙ qi in ˙ qn1 is equal to i















4r −2r 0 0 0 0
−2r 4r −2r 0 0 0
0 ... ... ... ... 0











−4r2 (n1 − 2)
−4r2 (n1 − 4)
...



















dη1 > 0 for every ˙ qi lower than 0.5. From b.2) and b.3), in equilibrium







c) Let Ei [π1 (Ln1,Q(Ln1))] denote the payoﬀ at period 1 expected ex-ante
by agent i in the case of a partition Q(Ln1) with each λi in Ln1 satisfying (24).
From Corollary 1, both the agents’ expected payoﬀs will be maximized if each
qi is equal to i
n1. Since η1 ∈ (0,1), from b.3) and b.4):
Ej
 





















∀j = E,D if n1 > 2, n2 > 1
29NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2010 
GC  1.2010  Cristina Cattaneo: Migrants’ International Transfers and Educational Expenditure: Empirical Evidence from 
Albania 
SD  2.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping 
SD  3.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Second Best Environmental Policies under 
Uncertainty 
SD  4.2010  Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian and Lea Nicita: Modeling Biased Technical Change. Implications for Climate 
Policy 
IM  5.2010  Luca Di Corato: Profit Sharing under the threat of Nationalization  
SD  6.2010  Masako Ikefuji, Jun-ichi Itaya and Makoto Okamura: Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location 
Choice of Duopolistic Firms 
SD  7.2010  Michela Catenacci and Carlo Giupponi: Potentials and Limits of Bayesian Networks to Deal with 
Uncertainty in the Assessment of Climate Change Adaptation Policies 
GC  8.2010  Paul Sarfo-Mensah and William Oduro: Changes in Beliefs and Perceptions about the Natural Environment 
in the Forest-Savanna Transitional Zone of Ghana: The Influence of Religion 
IM  9.2010  Andrea Boitani, Marcella Nicolini and Carlo Scarpa: Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence 
from Local Public Transport in Europe 
SD  10.2010  Helen Ding and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Sonja Teelucksingh: European Forests and Carbon Sequestration 
Services : An Economic Assessment of Climate Change Impacts 
GC  11.2010  Enrico Bertacchini, Walter Santagata and Giovanni Signorello: Loving Cultural Heritage Private Individual 
Giving and Prosocial Behavior 
SD  12.2010  Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière: What Drives the International Transfer of 
Climate Change Mitigation Technologies? Empirical Evidence from Patent Data 
SD  13.2010  Andrea Bastianin, Alice Favero and Emanuele Massetti: Investments and Financial Flows Induced by 
Climate Mitigation Policies 
SD  14.2010  Reyer Gerlagh: Too Much Oil 
IM  15.2010  Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta: A Simple Theory of Predation 
GC  16.2010  Rinaldo Brau, Adriana Di Liberto and Francesco Pigliaru: Tourism and Development: A Recent 
Phenomenon Built on Old (Institutional) Roots? 
SD  17.2010  Lucia Vergano, Georg Umgiesser and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of the 
MOSE Barriers on Venice Port Activities 
SD  18.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Climate Change Meets Trade in Promoting Green Growth: Potential Conflicts and 
Synergies  
SD  19.2010  Elisa Lanzi and Ian Sue Wing: Capital Malleability and the Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Policy 
IM  20.2010  Alberto Petrucci: Second-Best Optimal Taxation of Oil and Capital in a Small Open Economy 
SD  21.2010  Enrica De Cian and Alice Favero: Fairness, Credibility and Effectiveness in the Copenhagen Accord: An 
Economic Assessment 
SD  22.2010  Francesco Bosello: Adaptation, Mitigation and “Green” R&D to Combat Global Climate Change. Insights 
From an Empirical Integrated Assessment Exercise 
IM  23.2010  Jean Tirole and Roland Bénabou: Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility 
IM  24.2010  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Licences, "Use or Lose" Provisions and the Time of Investment 
GC  25.2010  Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Vassilis Tselios (lxxxvi): Returns to Migration, Education, and Externalities in 
the European Union 
GC  26.2010  Klaus Desmet and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (lxxxvi): Spatial Development 
SD  27.2010  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Francesco Nicolli: Waste Generation and Landfill Diversion 
Dynamics: Decentralised Management and Spatial Effects 
SD  28.2010  Lucia Ceccato, Valentina Giannini and Carlo Gipponi: A Participatory Approach to Assess the Effectiveness 
of Responses to Cope with Flood Risk 
SD  29.2010  Valentina Bosetti and David G. Victor: Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse
Gases:  The Importance of Regulatory Credibility 
IM  30.2010  Francesca Cornelli, Zbigniew Kominek and Alexander Ljungqvist: Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? 
GC  31.2010  Francesco D’Amuri and Juri Marcucci: “Google it!” Forecasting the US Unemployment Rate with a Google 
Job Search index 
SD  32.2010  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Carraro and Enrica De Cian: Climate Policy and the Optimal Balance between 
Mitigation, Adaptation and Unavoided Damage SD  33.2010  Enrica De Cian and Massimo Tavoni: The Role of International Carbon Offsets in a Second-best Climate 
Policy: A Numerical Evaluation 
SD  34.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses 
IM  35.2010  Vincenzo Denicolò and Piercarlo Zanchettin: Leadership Cycles 
SD  36.2010  Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion: How to Design a Border Adjustment for the European Union 
Emissions Trading System? 
SD  37.2010  Meriem Hamdi-Cherif, Céline Guivarch and Philippe Quirion: Sectoral Targets for Developing Countries:
Combining "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" with "Meaningful participation" 
IM  38.2010  G. Andrew Karolyi and Rose C. Liao: What is Different about Government-Controlled Acquirers in Cross-
Border Acquisitions? 
GC  39.2010  Kjetil Bjorvatn and Alireza Naghavi: Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace 
GC  40.2010  Andrea Mantovani and Alireza Naghavi: Parallel Imports and Innovation in an Emerging Economy 
SD  41.2010  Luke Brander, Andrea Ghermandi, Onno Kuik, Anil Markandya, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Marije Schaafsma 
and Alfred Wagtendonk: Scaling up Ecosystem Services Values: Methodology, Applicability and a Case 
Study 
SD  42.2010  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval and Massimo Tavoni: What Should We Expect from 
Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-
Related R&D 
SD  43.2010  Frank Vöhringer, Alain Haurie, Dabo Guan,Maryse Labriet, Richard Loulou, Valentina Bosetti, Pryadarshi 
R. Shukla and Philippe Thalmann: Reinforcing the EU Dialogue with Developing Countries on Climate 
Change Mitigation 
GC  44.2010  Angelo Antoci, Pier Luigi Sacco and Mauro Sodini: Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal 
Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear 
IM  45.2010  Luca Enriques: European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach  
SD  46.2010  Maureen L. Cropper, Yi Jiang, Anna Alberini and Patrick Baur: Getting Cars Off the Road: The Cost-
Effectiveness of an Episodic Pollution Control Program 
IM  47.2010  Thomas Hellman and Enrico Perotti: The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets 
IM  48.2010  James Dow and Enrico Perotti: Resistance to Change 
SD  49.2010  Jaromir Kovarik, Friederike Mengel and José Gabriel Romero: (Anti-) Coordination in Networks 
SD  50.2010  Helen Ding, Silvia Silvestri, Aline Chiabai and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: A Hybrid Approach to the Valuation of 
Climate Change Effects on Ecosystem Services: Evidence from the European Forests 
GC  51.2010  Pauline Grosjean (lxxxvii): A History of Violence: Testing the ‘Culture of Honor’ in the US South 
GC  52.2010  Paolo Buonanno and Matteo M. Galizzi (lxxxvii): Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the Supplier-Induced-
Demand Hypothesis for Italian Courts of Justice 
GC  53.2010  Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin (lxxxvii): Religious Organizations 
GC  54.2010  Matteo Cervellati and Paolo Vanin (lxxxvii): ”Thou shalt not covet ...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral 
Values 
GC  55.2010  Sebastian Galiani, Martín A. Rossi and Ernesto Schargrodsky (lxxxvii):  Conscription and Crime: Evidence 
from the Argentine Draft Lottery 
GC  56.2010  Alberto Alesina, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Paola Giuliano (lxxxvii): Family Values and the Regulation of 
Labor 
GC  57.2010  Raquel Fernández (lxxxvii): Women’s Rights and Development 
GC  58.2010  Tommaso Nannicini, Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, Ugo Troiano (lxxxvii): Social Capital and Political 
Accountability 
GC  59.2010  Eleonora Patacchini and  Yves Zenou (lxxxvii): Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism 
GC  60.2010  Gani Aldashev, Imane Chaara, Jean-Philippe Platteau and Zaki Wahhaj (lxxxvii): Using the Law to Change 
the Custom 
GC  61.2010  Jeffrey Butler, Paola Giuliano and Luigi Guiso (lxxxvii): The Right Amount of Trust 
SD  62.2010  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraio and Massimo Tavoni: Alternative Paths toward a Low Carbon World 
SD  63.2010  Kelly C. de Bruin, Rob B. Dellink and Richard S.J. Tol: International Cooperation on Climate Change 
Adaptation from an Economic Perspective 
IM  64.2010  Andrea Bigano, Ramon Arigoni Ortiz, Anil Markandya, Emanuela Menichetti and Roberta Pierfederici: The 
Linkages between Energy Efficiency and Security of Energy Supply in Europe 
SD  65.2010  Anil Markandya and Wan-Jung Chou: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall: Review of the Changes in the Environment and Natural Resources 
SD 66.2010  Anna Alberini and Milan Ščasný: Context and the VSL: Evidence from a Stated Preference Study in Italy and 
the Czech Republic 
SD  67.2010  Francesco Bosello, Ramiro Parrado and Renato Rosa: The Economic and Environmental Effects of an EU 
Ban on Illegal Logging Imports. Insights from a CGE Assessment 
IM  68.2010  Alessandro Fedele, Paolo M. Panteghini and Sergio Vergalli: Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies 
under Tax Rate Uncertainty 
IM  69.2010  Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi: Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-
Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt 
SD  70.2010  Xavier Pautrel: Environmental Policy, Education and Growth with Finite Lifetime: the Role of Abatement 
Technology 
SD  71.2010  Antoine Leblois and Philippe Quirion: Agricultural Insurances Based on Meteorological Indices: 
Realizations, Methods and Research Agenda 
IM  72.2010  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China 
IM  73.2010  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: The Consequences of Corruption: Evidence from China IM  74.2010  Fereydoun Verdinejad and Yasaman Gorji: The Oil-Based Economies International Research Project. The 
Case of Iran. 
GC  75.2010  Stelios Michalopoulos, Alireza Naghavi and Giovanni Prarolo (lxxxvii): Trade and Geography in the 
Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence 
SD  76.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: China in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy 
SD  77.2010  Valentina Iafolla, Massimiliano Mazzanti and Francesco Nicolli: Are You SURE You Want to Waste Policy 
Chances? Waste Generation, Landfill Diversion and Environmental Policy Effectiveness in the EU15 
IM  78.2010  Jean Tirole: Illiquidity and all its Friends 
SD  79.2010  Michael Finus and  Pedro Pintassilgo: International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does 
the Veil of Uncertainty Help? 
SD  80.2010  Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins: The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System 
Performance 
SD  81.2010  Francisco Alpizar, Fredrik Carlsson and Maria Naranjo (lxxxviii): The Effect of Risk, Ambiguity and 
Coordination on Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: A Framed Field Experiment 
SD  82.2010  Shardul Agrawala and Maëlis Carraro (lxxxviii): Assessing the Role of Microfinance in Fostering Adaptation 
to Climate Change 
SD 83.2010  Wolfgang  Lutz  (lxxxviii): Improving Education as Key to Enhancing Adaptive Capacity in Developing 
Countries 
SD  84.2010  Rasmus Heltberg, Habiba Gitay and Radhika Prabhu (lxxxviii): Community-based Adaptation: Lessons 
from the Development Marketplace 2009 on Adaptation to Climate Change 
SD  85.2010  Anna Alberini, Christoph M. Rheinberger, Andrea Leiter,  Charles A. McCormick and Andrew Mizrahi: 
What is the Value of Hazardous Weather Forecasts? Evidence from a Survey of Backcountry Skiers 
SD 86.2010  Anna Alberini, Milan Ščasný, Dennis Guignet and Stefania Tonin: The Benefits of Contaminated Site 
Cleanup Revisited: The Case of Naples and Caserta, Italy 
GC  87.2010  Paul Sarfo-Mensah, William Oduro, Fredrick Antoh Fredua and Stephen Amisah: Traditional 
Representations of the Natural Environment and Biodiversity Conservation: Sacred Groves in Ghana 
IM  88.2010  Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas Cooley and Sonia Di Giannatale: A Theory of Firm Decline 
IM  89.2010  Gian Luca Clementi and Thomas Cooley: Executive Compensation: Facts 
GC  90.2010  Fabio Sabatini: Job Instability and Family Planning: Insights from the Italian Puzzle 
SD  91.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Copenhagen and Beyond: Reflections on China’s Stance and Responses 
SD  92.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Assessing China’s Energy Conservation and Carbon Intensity: How Will the Future 
Differ from the Past? 
SD  93.2010  Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn and David Hemous: The Environment and Directed 
Technical Change 
SD  94.2010  Valeria Costantini and Massimiliano Mazzanti: On the Green Side of Trade Competitiveness? 
Environmental Policies and Innovation in the EU 
IM  95.2010  Vittoria Cerasi, Barbara Chizzolini and Marc Ivaldi: The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition 
in the Banking Industry 




97.2010  Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins: Three Key Elements of Post-2012 International Climate Policy 
Architecture 
SD  98.2010  Lawrence H. Goulder and Robert N. Stavins: Interactions between State and Federal Climate Change 
Policies 
IM  99.2010  Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen and Luigi Zingales: Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
GC  100.2010 Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: The Solaria Syndrome: Social Capital in a Growing 
Hyper-technological Economy 
SD  101.2010 Georgios Kossioris, Michael Plexousakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Aart de Zeeuw: On the Optimal 
Taxation of Common-Pool Resources 
SD  102.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Liberalizing Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies in the WTO: Product Coverage, 
Modalities, Challenges and the Way Forward 
SD  103.2010  Gérard Mondello: Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety 
GC  104.2010 João Ramos and Benno Torgler: Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field 
Experiment in the Work Environment 
IM  105.2010 Maurizio Ciaschini, Francesca Severini, Claudio Socci and Rosita Pretaroli: The Economic Impact of the 
Green Certificate Market through the Macro Multiplier Approach 
SD  106.2010 Joëlle Noailly: Improving the Energy-Efficiency of Buildings: The Impact of Environmental Policy on 
Technological Innovation 
SD  107.2010  Francesca Sanna-Randaccio and Roberta Sestini: The Impact of Unilateral Climate Policy with Endogenous 
Plant Location and Market Size Asymmetry 
SD 108.2010  Valeria  Costantini,  Massimiliano Mozzanti and Anna Montini: Environmental Performance and Regional 
Innovation Spillovers 
IM  109.2010 Elena Costantino, Maria Paola Marchello and Cecilia Mezzano: Social Responsibility as a Driver for Local 
Sustainable Development 
GC  110.2010 Marco Percoco: Path Dependence, Institutions and the Density of Economic Activities: Evidence from 
Italian Cities 
SD  111.2010 Sonja S. Teelucksingh and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: Biodiversity Valuation in Developing Countries: A Focus
on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
SD  112.2010 ZhongXiang Zhang: In What Format and under What Timeframe Would China Take on Climate 
Commitments? A Roadmap to 2050 SD  113.2010 Emanuele Massetti and Fabio Sferra: A Numerical Analysis of Optimal Extraction and Trade of Oil under 
Climate Policy 
IM  114.2010 Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny: A Numerical Analysis of Optimal Extraction and 
Trade of Oil under Climate Policy 
GC  115.2010  Romano Piras: Internal Migration Across Italian regions: Macroeconomic Determinants and 
Accommodating Potential for a Dualistic Economy 
SD  116.2010  Messan Agbaglah and Lars Ehlers (lxxxix): Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks 
SD  117.2010 Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi (lxxxix):Spying in Multi-
market Oligopolies 
SD  118.2010  Roman Chuhay  (lxxxix): Marketing via Friends: Strategic Diffusion of Information in Social Networks with 
Homophily 
SD  119.2010 Françoise Forges and Ram Orzach (lxxxix): Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common 
Values 
SD  120.2010  Markus Kinateder (lxxxix): The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network 
SD  121.2010  Alexey Kushnir (lxxxix): Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets 
SD  122.2010 Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov (lxxxix): Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous 
Players 
SD  123.2010  Maria Montero (lxxxix): The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative 
Bargaining Analysis 
SD  124.2010  Leonardo Boncinelli and Paolo Pin (lxxxix): Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game 
SD  125.2010  Nicolas Quérou (lxxxix): Group Bargaining and Conflict 
SD  126.2010 Emily Tanimura (lxxxix): Diffusion of Innovations on Community Based Small Worlds: the Role of 
Correlation between Social Spheres 
SD  127.2010  Alessandro Tavoni, Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin (lxxxix): The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure 
and Renewable Resource Management 
SD  128.2010 Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano (lxxxix): Information, Stability and Dynamics in Networks under 
Institutional Constraints 
GC  129.2010 Darwin Cortés, Guido Friebel and Darío Maldonado (lxxxvii): Crime and Education in a Model of 
Information Transmission 
IM  130.2010 Rosella Levaggi, Michele Moretto and Paolo Pertile: Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health 
Care Investments under Alternative Payment Rules 
SD  131.2010  Robert N. Stavins: The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years 
SD  132.2010  Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet and Dominique Finon: On the Road to a Unified Market for Energy Efficiency: The 
Contribution of White Certificates Schemes 
SD  133.2010  Melina Barrio and Maria Loureiro: The Impact of Protest Responses in Choice Experiments 
IM  134.2010 Vincenzo Denicolò and Christine Halmenschlager: Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented 
Property Rights 
GC  135.2010 Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu and Elisa Ticci: Local Communities in front of Big External Investors: An 
Opportunity or a Risk? 
SD  136.2010 Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti: Beyond Copenhagen: A Realistic Climate Policy in a Fragmented 
World 
SD  137.2010 Valentin Przyluski and Stéphane Hallegatte: Climate Change Adaptation, Development, and International 
Financial Support: Lessons from EU Pre-Accession and Solidarity Funds 
SD  138.2010 Ruslana Rachel Palatnik and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: Valuation of Linkages between Climate Change, 
Biodiversity and Productivity of European Agro-Ecosystems 
SD 139.2010  Anna Alberini and Milan Ščasný: Does the Cause of Death Matter? The Effect of Dread, Controllability, 
Exposure and Latency on the Vsl 
IM  140.2010  Gordon L. Clark and Ashby H. B. Monk: Sovereign Wealth Funds: Form and Function in the 21st Century  
SD  141,2010 Simone Borghesi: The European Emission Trading Scheme and Renewable Energy Policies: Credible 
Targets for Incredible Results? 
SD  142.2010  Francesco Bosello and Fabio Eboli: REDD in the Carbon Market: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
SD  143.2010 Irene Valsecchi: Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an 
Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias 
 
(lxxxvi) This paper was presented at the Conference on "Urban and Regional Economics" organised by the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and FEEM, held in Milan on 12-13 October 2009. 
(lxxxvii)  This paper was presented at the Conference on “Economics of Culture, Institutions and Crime” 
organised by SUS.DIV, FEEM, University of Padua and CEPR, held in Milan on 20-22 January 2010. 
(lxxxviii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on “The Social Dimension of Adaptation to 
Climate Change”, jointly organized by the International Center for Climate Governance, Centro Euro-
Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, held in Venice, 18-19 February 
2010. 
(lxxxix)  This paper was presented at the 15th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the 
Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille, (GREQAM), held in Marseille, France, on 
June 17-18, 2010.  
 